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I.
The United States was quick to grasp and develop the material
possibilities of the Industrial Revolution which started with the
introduction of steam power nearly a century ago. It has since
recognized and, to a considerable degree, responded to its oppor-
tunities for the workers. But it has lagged behind England and
the great commercial nations of the Continent in grasping an
understanding of the legal obligations involved. We have
achieved brilliant progress in the technic of rapid mass produc-
tion in the shops, and breathless haste in the office to keep mar-
keting in step with output. But the cycle of production for
profit does not close with the sales office; it is postponed to the
cashier's cage where payment is made. This extension creates
two risks of its own: credit and litigation. It is with the prob-
lem of litigation and its solution through commercial arbitration
that this article will deal.
A considerable measure of security has enabled commerce to
develop to the point where the producer frequently sells, and the
buyer resells, what has not been made. Often, indeed, a manu-
facturer's products may be sold through jobber and wholesaler
to the retailer who will sell to the ultimate consumer; and this
series of transactions may be entered into before the manufac-
turer has delivery of the raw materials from which these partic-
ular goods will be made. The security which makes such mar-
keting methods possible lies in the development of specifications
and of trade standards and customs. But it is not full insur-
ance against misunderstandings and errors on the part of re-
sponsible business men and against sharp practices on the part
of the less responsible. And sudden price fluctuations between
the signing of contracts and delivery of the goods sometimes
cause too heavy a strain upon responsibility.
Relief in honest differences, as well as in cases of imposition,
is theoretically in the courts. Practically, however, security for
commerce often falls down here for one of three reasons. The
first is that the congestion of court calendars causes serious de-
lay in getting relief, in the meantime tying up goods or money;
if novelties, which have become an important supplement to many
lines of staple products, are involved, even a comparatively
short delay will cause them to miss their market. The second
reason is the expense in court costs and attorneys' fees which ac-
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cumulate rapidly in delayed or protracted litigation. The third
is the uncertainty of intelligent and adequate relief.
This last point is especially significant as the bulk of civil con-
troversies arise not from differences in the interpretation of the
law but from disputes as to facts. Our theory of justice is based
upon trial by our peers. In the case of an action affecting one's
person, this theory is, roughly, sound; for we are all more or
less human and can understand one another's motives. In the
case of actions affecting property rights or contractual relations
of a highly technical nature, we are in no sense all peers. It is
inconceivable that a boss teamster or a farmer, a life insurance
agent or a shoe manufacturer can intelligently pass upon the
quality of a bale of imported lambskins to decide whether certain
print goods are sufficiently close to sample to be a good delivery,
or determine whether a surgeon was right in charging for two
preliminary operations which were necessary when he began to
prepare for a special operation; yet we draw our juries from all
walks of life to render justice (which assumes a basis of intelli-
gence) in complicated cases involving some one highly special-
ized trade. Of course, "experts" may be called as witnesses by
one side; but this is invariably countered by the other side call-
ing its own "experts". Under such conditions it requires a
super-expert to cut through the resulting confusion to the truth;
and it is not common sense to suppose that either judge or jury
can qualify for this more difficult task if they are not competent
to weigh the simple, "uninterpreted" facts.
H.
Having suggested the difficulties inherent in applying the jury
system to the highly technical issues resulting from an increas-
ing specialization in commerce, let us examine the physical abl-
ity of our judicial channels to care for the present volume of
litigation. It is only fair to say that our judicial processes have
tried to keep pace with the increasing requirements of commerce.
But despite every effort made to simplify procedure and the
technical requirements of the courts, despite the liberality of
state legislatures and municipal bodies in appropriating funds to
provide for additional judges and increased facilities, litigation
has failed to furnish the remedy for the speedy and inexpensive
settlement of these controversies. In ten years, the business of
the Federal courts has more than doubled. On April 30, 1925,
there were pending one hundred and sixty-two thousand, six
hundred and seventy-five cases (both civil and criminal), accord-
ing to a recent report of the United States Attorney General.
Although one hundred and fourteen thousand cases were tc'emii-
ated from July 1, 1924 to April 30, 1925, nearly one hundred and
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twenty-six thousand cases were commenced during the same
period, thus leaving the docket further congested by some twelve
thousand cases. In Massachusetts, according to reports of the
Secretary of the Commonwealth, fifty-three thousand seven hun-
dred and eighty-four cases were pending in the Superior Court
at the end of 1924, twenty-five thousand one hundred and ninety-
four having been added during the year, compared with thirty-
one thousand six hundred and ninety-five pending at the end of
1914, during which year only fourteen thousand six hundred and
twenty-six new cases had been entered. In New York, in the
First Judicial District alone, more than twenty-three thousand
cases were on the General Calendar awaiting trial, as compared
with eight thousand untried cases on January 1, 1917. Justice
Charles L. Guy, of the New York Supreme Court, has stated
that not more than ten thousand cases, including discontinuances,
can be properly disposed of in each year. Yet in 1920, the new
issues amounted to eleven thousand, in 1921 to thirteen thousand,
and there were corresponding increases in later years. It would
take approximately two and a half years to dispose of the present
untried calendar; but the normal annual increase of new cases
would make it practically impossible to keep abreast of the vol-
ume of litigation.
"Various remedies have been suggested", writes Justice Guy
in the New York Law Journal of August 5th, 1925, "such as the
appointment of masters to dispose of intermediate motions, the
limiting of appeals, &c., which will help to some extent, but will
not prove adequate to remedy the evil. The only remaining
practical remedy that I know of is arbitration, by which it would
be possible, in my judgment, to dispose of at least 20 or 25 per
cent of litigated cases, involving of course only ordinary ques-
tions of law. This would leave our courts still with a sufficient
calendar to fully occupy the time of the justices, and even of
additional justices if it should be deemed wise to increase the
number."
III.
In a number of European countries, for a great many years,
business men generally have had recourse to arbitration, instead
of litigation, for the settlement of their disputes. In England,
the Year Book of Edward II and the next reign make such fre-
quent reference to it that it is evident that submission to arbitra-
tion was very common. And Edward II reigned in the early four-
teenth century! It was not until 1697, that a statute' was en-
acted making it contempt of court to revoke a submission to
arbitration which had been agreed to be "made a rule of court."
1 (1697) 9 Win. 3, c. 15.
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With the constant use of arbitration, this provision was gradually
extended until now every written submission becomes "a rule
of court" unless a contrary intention is specifically indicated.
"The striking absence of commercial cases from the trial lists
of England's great High Court of Justice" is noted in an inter-
esting report on Commercial Arbitrationi in Engla by Samuel
Rosenbaum of the Philadelphia Bar..2
In an introduction to this report,3 Prof. Herbert Harley, Sec-
retary of the American Judicature Society, states:
"It is easy to understand the success of arbitration so far as
it involves adjudication of disputed facts in commercial trans-
actions. The procedure of the formal court with judge and jury
cannot permit of successful competition in this field.
"1. The jury is necessarily uninformed as to the technical ques-
tions involved, usually those of quality and condition of wares.
It is hardly possible to educate a jury sufficiently in a particular
cause and such education is slow and costly.
"2. The common law powers of the jury, in most American
states, are greatly abridged, thus limiting the opportunity for
an experienced judge to overcome the inexperience of jurors.
"3. We- cannot get away from the jury even in commercial
causes, and in the cases when no jury is demanded, the judge,
however versed in commercial law, cannot be equal to the expert
2 Bulletin XII, of the American Judicature Society, October, 1916, at 7.
In an abstract of the report, Mr. Rosenbaum writes: "A very large pro-
portion of the business disputes of England never come into the courts
at all, but are adjusted by tribunals established within the various trade
associations and exchanges. This is especially true of the vast wholesale
distributing trades which are responsible for a great part of the immense
volume of imports and exports constantly flowing through the ports of
England and giving them the commanding position they occupy towards
the sea-borne trade of the world. Disputes over the quality and condition
of consignments of grain, cotton, sugar, coffee, fruit, rubber, timber, meats,
hides, seeds, fibres, fats, and countless other articles of commerce, as well
as every conceivable variety of dispute that can arise out of a contract
for sale and delivery, such as questions of delays, quantities, freightq,
interpretation, etc.,-and all these are passed upon by business arbitrators
selected by reason of their familiarity with the customs of the trade and
with the technical facts involved, and not submitted to juries whose ig-
norance would usually be equally comprehensive.
"So firmly established is the custom of arbitration in these lines that
every contract-form used by shippers, brokers, buyers and users of theze
articles contains a clause binding the parties to submit to arbitration any
dispute that might arise out of the contract. But it is not these trade.i
alone that resort to arbitration. The arbitration clause will be found in
every charter-party for the hire of a ship, in every bill of lading for
goods carried by sea, in every salvage agreement, in every policy of marine,
accident or fire insurance, in every building contract, in every engineer-
ing contract whether mechanical, electrical or gas, in every lease of prop-
erty, in every partnership or agency agreement, and in innumerable other
forms of contract. Finally, there is a well confirmed tradition among
business men, even though there is no written contract covering a par-
ticular dispute, to submit differences to arbitration after they have arisen."
3 Op. cit. supra note 2, at 4.
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lay, arbitrator who has spent a long career in a narrow and tech-
nical field.
"4. The business of the court must be conducted in formal
manner, with only limited reference to the convenience of liti-
gants. Causes must take their turn on the calendar and even
in courts which are quite abreast of their work-overlooking the
fact that such courts are almost unknown in American cities-
there cannot possibly be such flexibility with reference to hold-
ing of sessions as when lay arbitrators preside. The successful
employment of arbitration on any considerable scale permits of
the creation of temporary commercial tribunals on short notice
in scores of places, expanding or contracting in number to accord
with the volume of business. Such a practice goes far to relieve
the courts from work which they cannot do economically and
permits them to concentrate upon classes of causes in which they
are indispensable. The necessity for the organized court to con-
serve its energies is sufficient warrant for the expectation that
such courts will welcome the introduction of commercial arbi-
tration."
IV.
In the United States a number of the states have had for many
years some form of arbitration statute, of varying degrees of
enforceability and effectiveness. New York State, however, was
the first4 to enunciate the principle that a clause in a contract to
arbitrate any dispute that may arise thereunder is valid, enforce-
able and irrevocable. A submission to arbitration of an existing
controversy was also made irrevocable by the same statute. The
states of New Jersey,5 Oregon, 6 and Massachusetts, 7 followed
New York in adopting the same fundamental policies.
The United States Arbitration Act,8 signed by President Cool-
idge on February 12, 1925 and becoming operative on January
1, 1926, contains the same basic principles for enforcement
through the Federal courts. Under its provisions, agreements
to arbitrate disputes or controversies that may arise out of a
contract or that are already existing and which relate to "mari-
time transactions" or "commerce among the several states or
with foreign countries," and which involve diversity of citizen-
ship and sums of $3,000 or over, are valid, irrevocable and en-
forceable. The Federal courts are empowered to enforce such
arbitration agreements in those cases in which they would nor-
mally have jurisdiction of the controversy between the parties.
In an arbitration affecting admiralty matters, the right is pre-
served to libel a vessel or other property at the commencement
4N. Y. Cons. Laws, 1923, ch. 72.
5N. J. Laws, 1923, ch. 134.
6 Or. Gen. Laws, 1925, ch. 186.
ass. Acts and Resolves, 1925, ch. 294.
s Act of Feb. 12, 1925, No. 401.
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of the proceeding in order to safeguard the interests of the
claimants.
The procedure for enforcing the agreement, which is definitely
outlined in the Act, assures a speedy and inexpensive settlement
of the controversy. If a party declines to proceed with the ar-
bitration, the Federal court which ordinarily adjudicates the
subject matter involved, may be petitioned for an order direct-
ing that the arbitration proceed in accordance with the agree-
ment. Arbitrators are named by the parties or, upon the appli-
cation of either party, one or more may be designated by the
court; they may summon witnesses, and place them under oath,
compel the production of books and papers, hear the evidence
and render a decision. The award must be in writing and the
parties may agree that, upon proper entry, it shall become a
judgment of the court; it may be vacated only where it was pro-
cured by corruption, fraud or undue means or where arbitrators
were obviously partial, were guilty of misconduct or exceeded
their powers, but it may be modified to correct an evident mis-
calculation of figures or a mistake in description. Proceedings
to confirm must be brought within one year after the award is
made, and to vacate or correct within three months after it is
delivered. All applications to the court are heard in the same
manner as motions are disposed of.
The American Bar Association, through its Committee on
Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, which drafted the Fed-
eral bill, comments:9 "No piece of commercial legislation, no
enactment at the request of lawyers has been passed by Congress
in a quarter of a century comparable in value to this."
This Federal law has not yet been tested in the courts, but
there appears to be ample legal justification for it.1° The United
States Supreme Court, in its decision in the case of Red Cross
9 A. B. A. Joum, March, 1925, 153. In commenting upon the fact that
the bill was passed unanimously in both House and Senate, the report adds:
"At a time when the Bar is charged with lack of appreciation of the needs
of business in modeling legal procedure, what greater answer to the criti-
cism can be made than that the American Bar Association, with the sup-
port of the business men of the country, prepared and with the aid of the
lawyers in Congress secured, the enactment into law of a policy ebang-
ing an anachronism of three centuries' standing and providing a machinery
so simple that it requires only the action by trade bodies throughout the
country and of business men generally to make its application effective?"
3o Op. cit. supra note 9, at 154. "By the Constitution of the United
States Congress is given power 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes,' and 'to con-
stitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court'. (Art. I, Se. 8).
'The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in such inferior
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish' and
extends 'to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution,
the laws of the United States,' and 'to all cases of admiralty and maritime
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Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,", expressed itself very definitely, how-
ever, regarding the enforceability of an arbitration agreement
entered into under the New York Law. Despite the fact that
the dispute involved a maritime transaction and arose out of a
contract containing an arbitration clause, entered into in New
York, the Court held that New York "had the power to confer
upon its courts the authority to compel parties within its juris-
diction to specifically perform an agreement for arbitration,
'which is valid by the general maritime law, as well as by the law
of the State, which is contained in a contract made in New York
and which, by its terms, is to be performed there."
Incidental questions of law were also indirectly disposed of by
this decision. An agreement to arbitrate is always valid, but its
specific performance cannot be ordered without statutory pro-
vision. Where such a remedy is provided under a state law and
the state courts have acquired jurisdiction, they may enforce an
agreement to arbitrate a dispute, even though it arises out of a
maritime transaction, which normally comes within the juris-
diction of the Federal courts. Having gone so far in enforcing
a state law, which is so similar to the new Federal Act, it is safe
to assume that the latter will also be held constitutional. Its
beneficial effects in determining controversies over which the
Federal courts would normally have jurisdiction should there-
fore be far-reaching.
V.
Trade organizations and chambers of commerce, as well as
professional associations, have naturally been actively interested
in arbitration. An analysis recently made by the Arbitration
Society of America indicates that approximately one hundred
and seventy-five trade groups, exclusive of commercial associa-
tions, are promoting arbitration among their members; some
fifty have adopted standard contracts containing uniform arbi-
tration clauses, while the remaining one hundred and twenty-
jurisdiction.' (Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2). Congress is given authority to
make all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers
vested by the Constitution in the Government or any department or officer
thereof. (Art. I, Sec. 8). Powers not delegated to the United States are
reserved to the States. (Tenth Amendment).
"It does not seem that the law depends for its validity solely on the
exercise of the interstate commerce and admiralty powers of Congress.
The statute establishes a procedure in the Federal courts for the en-
forcement of arbitration agreements. It rests upon the constitutional
provision by which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior
Federal courts. So far as congressional acts relate to the procedure in
the Federal courts, they are clearly within the congressional power. Thig
principle is so evident and so firmly established that it can not be seriously
disputed."
it (1924) 264 U. S. 109, 44 Sup. Ct. 274.
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five have facilities or advocate arbitration in some form, although
not all have regularly established tribunals or permanent com-
mittees. Their activities range from the constantly functioning
tribunals in the motion-picture industry, where thirty-two tri-
bunals representing distributors and exhibitors operating under
a compulsory arbitration clause have adjusted some eleven thou-
sand controversies in one year, to the simple endorsement of the
principle of arbitration and of its use among its members by the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
An individual, firm or corporation may assure itself against
litigation by providing for arbitration through the insertion of
an appropriate clause in contracts, purchase slips, sales orders,
letters and other forms of agreement, under the arbitration laws
of the United States and of the states of New York, New Jersey,
Oregon and Massachusetts. Although the enforceability of an
award is dependent upon the effectiveness of the particular stat-
ute, or upon the good-will of the parties, it is significant to note
that trade organizations and business firms and corporations,
whose standard contracts contain an arbitration clause, report
that the mere presence of such a clause automatically reduces the
number of formal arbitrations. The fact that the voluntary
agreement to arbitrate then becomes compulsory, usually brings
about an amicable adjustment of the dispute by the parties
themselves.
Chambers of commerce in a number of cities have taken the
leadership in promoting the use of arbitration, and especially in
securing the necessary legislation, as in Boston, Cleveland, Indi-
anapolis, Newark, New Orleans, New York, Rochester, St. Louis,
San Francisco, etc. Where arbitral tribunals are maintained,
they function in business and commercial disputes generally, and
vary, therefore, from the trade organization tribunals in that
they are not limited to controversies arising within a particular
trade or a specialized market.
The Arbitration Society of America maintains an arbitral tri-
bunal, in addition to its nation-wide educational and legislative
activities, open to the public generally. Controversies of mis-
cellaneous character are, therefore, arbitrated under its rules.
It is of interest to note that a considerable proportion of the
several hundred cases so arbitrated have been referred to the
Society by lawyers, acting in behalf of their clients. Different
types of cases have been formally settled in this tribunal, as
evidenced by the following brief summaries from its docket:
Docket No. 165-A silk manufacturer sent twenty-three pieces
of goods to a dyeing establishment to be crossed-dyed, the design
to be a light background with a large check. He later refused
to accept the goods, claiming that the background was so dark
as to make the merchandise unmarketable. Two silk merchants
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and the vice-president of a dye works were agreed upon as the
arbitrators. After hearing the evidence they examined the
goods and found that as a practical matter it was impossible to
dye the goods as ordered by the silk manufacturer. They also
found that part of the material could be re-dyed in other com-
binations that were in considerable demand in the market. They
awarded the silk manufacturer an allowance of fifty cents a yard
and directed that the goods be re-dyed without charge in five
colors to be agreed upon between the parties to the dispute.
One of the arbitrators was designated as umpire in case any
question should arise as to the five colors.
Docket No. 110-A New York jobber and a toy manufacturer'
in the Middle West had been doing business together for some
twenty years, the volume having grown to some $60,000 annually.
There had been no specific contract as to territory or amount, the
jobber having merely given a general estimate of his requirements
for the year, ordering as he desired and paying on delivery. A
son took over the manufacturing business and asked the jobber
for a written contract for a stated amount of merchandise and a
definite territory. Considerable correspondence developed about
this proposed contract. The jobber then discovered that the toy
manufacturer's New. York office had been selling to some of his
customers and that certain large department stores had been
given the jobbers' price instead of the regular wholesale pric&
to retailers. A controversy arose over this situation and finally
arbitration was suggested. When the manufacturer was in New
York on other business he inquired into the State Arbitration
Law and consented to arbitration. He claimed some $11,000 as
balance due on goods delivered and the jobber made a counter-
claim of some $37,000 for alleged breach of contract. The arbi-
trators agreed upon by the disputants and the reasons for their
selection were: John H. Towne, of Yale & Towne, as an expe-
rienced manufacturer; Arthur Ginsberg, of the Edmund-Wright-
Ginsberg Company, as an outstanding factor and jobber; and
ex-Senator James A. O'Gorman, former Justice of the New York
Supreme Court, for his knowledge of the law. The unanimous
award was that no contract existed, that the claim for breach of
contract was therefore disallowed, and that the admitted balance
of $10,906 be awarded to the manufacturer. A feature of the
proceedings was that the hearings were arranged to coincide with
the manufacturer's regular business trips to New York, thus
causing him no extra expense in time and money.
Docket No. 173-A noted eye doctor agreed to perform for
$1,000 an operation to remove a cataract. A preliminary oper-
ation was performed but just before the time for the major one,
the patient, who was eighty-one, complained of trouble with the
lashes of the affected eye. The doctor therefore performed a
special operation known as the Ziegler puncture. He then per-
mitted his patient to go to the country for the summer. Upon
his return tests were again taken preliminary to removing the
cataract. Infection was discovered in the eye and the doctor
decided that it was necessary to remove the tear glands. This
was done and soon after this the cataract operation was per-
formed satisfactorily. The doctor then rendered a bill for $2,300,
which included the $1,000 for the removal of the cataract, $500
each for the two special operations and $300 for office treatments.
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The bill was disputed and both parties agreed to arbitration.
The arbitrators agreed upon by them were a well-known pub-
lisher, the president of an important real estate company, and
a doctor who is generally recognized as the dean of opticians in
this country. The doctor called three prominent men in his
profession as witnesses. Examination of the patient brought
out that his sight had been greatly improved, that he was in much
better physical condition than he had been, and that the total
charge was not beyond his means. The doctor testified that,
while he could have removed the cataract without prior operation
on the tear glands, the result would have been the death of the
patient; that the question of pay did not influence his action where
he deemed operations necessary, and that ninety per cent of his
operating was done free in public hospitals. The doctor was
awarded his full claim of $2,300.
Docket No. 258-An actress signed a Standard Minimum
Equity contract to appear in a play which duly opened in New
York. After running two months the lease on the theatre e.-
pired and, there being no other theatre available in New York,
the producer decided to transfer the play to Chicago. The ac-
tress refused to go, alleging that she had a verbal understanding
that she was to play only in New York. The dispute was arbi-
trated before one of the leading factors in the textile industry.
In support of her allegation the actress testified that she had
leased an apartment in New York with the full kmowledge of
the producer, and that he had been, in fact, one of her references
when she made this lease. She had entered into a business
undertaking involving several hundred dollars and it was essen-
tial for her to stay in New York to carry it out. The producer
testified that the only understanding had been that there would
be no try-out of the play on the road and that this understanding
had been lived up to. He brought out that it was a rule of the
Actors' Equity Association that unless the performers had con-
tracts specifying New York City only, they must accompany a
show on the road; or, where they had Standard Minimum con-
tracts, they could give two weeks' notice and then leave. The
producer further testified that he had offered the actress a salary
increase to compensate for this forced trip to Chicago. The
arbitrator's award was that the actress must give two weeks'
notice if she wished to terminate the contract, and therefore
must go to Chicago to open there with the show. In the find-
ings the arbitrator recommended that the producer forget the
differences and give the actress the salary increase suggested.
Docket No. 89-A manufacturer of paper pie-plates placed
with an importing company an order for Scandinavian pulp board
to the amount of $37,181.62. The board was delivered in bundles
of a definite size and weight, but in the shipment in dispute the
individual sheets were thicker than called for. The greater
thickness meant an increase in quality but a decrease in quantity.
The buyer sought an allowance because extra quality is of no
moment in a paper pie-plate. Both parties agreed to arbitration
and chose as arbitrators three experienced men in the heavy
paper trade. Samples for this and previous shipments were
examined and it was brought out in the testimony that the sellei,
knew the -purpose for which the paper-board was wanted and
had discussed with the buyer the question of sheetaqe in con-
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nection with a previous shipment. The award was that the
buyer was entitled to an allowance of 21/ on the purchase price
to compensate him for the decreased sheetage caused by unex-
pected increase in thickness. An interesting feature of this ar-
bitration was that, while waiting for the arbitrators to decide
upon their award, the seller started negotiations with the manu-
facturer to sell him another shipment and received a verbal ac-
ceptance on the way down in the elevator as they left together
after the decision had been rendered.
Docket No. 33-A contractor entered into an agreement to re-
model and renovate a house for $14,000; this was later amended
and increased by $1,500. The sum of $11,500 was paid on ac-
count. Delays developed in the work and, after several dis-
agreements, a new contractor was called in to complete the job.
The first contractor claimed that there was only $400 of work
uncompleted, but the contract with the second contractor was
for $3,000. Nine sub-contractors under the first contract filed
claims and a majority of them filed mechanics' liens. Arbitra-
tion was agreed to by the first contractor and the owner, and,
after a conference at the offices of the Arbitration Society, all
nine sub-contractors also agreed to submit their claims to the
same arbitration. An arbitration board, consisting of two at-
torneys and the president of a large realty company, was agreed
upon and nine hearings were held Saturday afternoons to per-
mit the witnesses to appear without loss of business time. The
arbitrators awarded to the contractor $1,304.50 on the contract
and $300 for extra work; awarded to the sub-contractors a total
of $4,208.99; directed that the award to the contractor be de-
posited with the Arbitration Society for pro-rating among the
sub-contractors, that judgments be awarded to them against
the contractor for the balance of their claims, and that the satis-
faction of mechanics' liens filed with the arbitrators be turned
over to the owner of the building so that his title might be cleared.
Over protest by the contractor the complete award was deemed
proper by the Supreme Court, Kings County, and was duly entered
as a judgment. Thus, this one arbitration disposed of ten
separate issues at the same time (several of the sub-contractors
had already started actions in the Supreme Court but had dis-
continued them upon agreeing to arbitration) and the cost was
$5.00 each to the sub-contractors and $15.00 each, plus the arbi-
trators' fees of $600, to the contractor and the owner.
New York State has had five years of practical experience with
the operation of an effective and comprehensive arbitration law.
It has withstood many attacks, and the courts have gradually in-
terpreted the scope and meaning of its provisions. Because the
Federal Act parallels -so closely the New York statute, an analysis
of the decisions under the latter may be helpful in an under-
standing of the former.
The validity of an arbitration agreement has been definitely
affirmed. A statutory provision making a contract to arbitrate
enforceable and irrevocable, except on such grounds as existed in
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law or in equity for revocation of any contract, is constitutional. -
Such an agreement is not self-executing, however, as the arbi-
tration law merely provides machinery whereby the court may
apply sanctions to carry out the terms of the agreement, but it
can no more now than formerly proceed ex parte without the
direction of the court.13
The strict rules governing an action at law are not applicable
to arbitration proceedings. An arbitration, while it partakes
of the nature of a quasi-judicial proceeding, is not such a pro-
ceeding in a technical sense. It is a domestic tribunal as dis-
tinguished from a regularly organized court. The very exist-
ence of the tribunal depends upon the voluntary acts of the
disputants. They select their own judges. Its object and aim is
to arrive at a just determination of the matters in dispute, and
finally dispose of them in a speedy and inexpensive way, thus to
avoid any future litigation between the parties. To require an
arbitrator to follow the fixed rules of law in arriving at his
award would operate to defeat the object of the proceeding. The
proper court would still have to pass upon and decide the law
and the facts as if no award had been made.14 The word "irre-
vocable" as used in Section 2 of the New York Arbitration Law,"
providing that an arbitration agreement "shall be valid, enforc-
ible [sic] and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract," means that
the contract to arbitrate cannot be revoked at the will of one
party to it, but can only be set aside for facts existing at or before
the time of its making which would move a court of law or equity
to revoke any other contract or provision of a contract. It does
not mean that the agreement to arbitrate is irrevocable by the
mutual agreement or consent of the parties.10
While the Arbitration Law provides for the enforcement of
arbitration, there is nothing in it which prevents the parties from
agreeing between themselves to resort to any other method of
settlement or to abandon the arbitration provision in their con-
tract. 7  In fact, if the legislature should attempt to prevent
12 Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg (1921) 230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E. 283.
:13 Bullard v. Morgan H. Grace Co. (1924, 1st Dept.) 210 App. Div. 476,
206 N. Y. Supp. 335.
14 E-verett v. Brown (1923, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 120 Misc. 349, 193 N. Y.
Supp. 462, wherein the court added that the "arbitrators are usually
laymen, inexperienced in the technical rules of law, but usually pozsessed
with a fund of common sense which enables them to do substantial justice
between the parties."
3 Supra note 4.
6 Matter of Zlminrma v. Cohen (1923) 236 N. Y. 15, 139 N. E. 764.
17 Ibid. In this case the plaintiffs brought their action in a court of law,
ignoring the agreement to arbitrate, and defendant answered setting up
a counterclaim, upon which he asked the court to give judgment against
the plaintiff, served notice of trial and procured an order for the tahing
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parties from modifying their agreements to arbitrate or from
subsequently agreeing to enter the courts of law for the settle-
ment of their disputes, it would be such an abridgment of the
right of citizens to contract, that the constitutionality of the law
might well be doubted.
In the absence of some statutory prohibition, any person may
be selected to act as arbitrator, irrespective of legal or natural
disabilities. Every person must use his own discretion in the
choice of his judges. A party cannot be compelled, however,
to arbitrate before a foreign corporation without the state, for
the reason that no award taken without the state may be the
basis of a judgment.'8 One of the first requisites of an arbitra-
tor is that he possess judicial impartiality and that he be free
from bias; and before the court will set aside an award for
partiality, the partiality of an arbitrator must be clearly shown,
the burden for which rests on the party making the charge. 19
Under the rules of the Arbitration Society of America, both
parties to a Otispute are urged to agree on all of the arbitrators
in a given case; in other words, the one, three or more arbitrators
who are to hear the evidence and render the award, should repre-
sent both parties and thus be able to approach their task with a
judicial mind. Under the rules of certain trade organizations,
however, each side is permitted to select its own arbitrator, and
the two then agree upon a third, N ho is the umpire; in this man-
ner each side really has its own advocate on the arbitration board
rather than an impartial arbitrator.
The New York Court of Appeals recently ruled that after the
final hearing and submission of the controversy to the arbitrators,
one of three arbitrators cannot by his resignation prevent the
other two from rendering a valid award under a submission agree-
ment providing for an award by a majority and for the filling
of vdcancies in case an arbitrator resigns, and condemmed the
of depositions in preparation for trial. These acts were held clearly in-
consistent with the defendant's later claim that the parties were obligated
to settle their differences by arbitration, the court saying that "the facts
in this case show that the parties elected to settle 'their disputes not by
arbitration but in a court of law. The arbitration provision of the con-
tract was abandoned or waived."
2
8
in re California Packing Corporation (1923, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 121
Misc. 212, 201 N. Y. Supp. 158. The written agreement here provided for
the submission to arbitration to an association in California. In Cali-
fornia, neither party could be compelled to arbitrate under their agreement.
See Calif. Civ. Code, 1919, sec. 3390.
1' Everett v. Brown, supra note 14, wherein it was held that the fact
that an arbitrator made an affidavit in an action pending between the par-
ties to a submission, a short time after he participated in making the award
(in which he related certain facts which he had observed and heard) was
not sufficient to sustain a charge of partiality.
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practice of arbitrators of conducting themselves as champions
of their nominators.20
Arbitrators must not go beyond the limits of the questions sub-
mitted to them, since parties must not be deprived of their con-
stitutional rights to redress in the courts, in the absence of agree-
ment to forego such rights. The fact, however, that certain
subjects are specifically mentioned as matters to be submitted
does not justify the conclusion that all others are to be excluded.
The agreement for arbitration is to be given effect in the most
liberal sense, as accomplishing a complete and final settlement of
all existing controversies-"; and when the arbitrators act im-
partially within the powers confided to them by the parties, their
award cannot be interfered with by the courts.22
In determining the validity of an award, the courts have held
that every reasonable intendment will be indulged in to give
effect to the proceedings of the arbitrators and in favor of the
regularity and integrity of their acts. Exact certainty is not in-
dispensable to the validity of an award. -  There is no provision
in the statutes authorizing the court to vacate an award because
it is against the weight of evidence or because, perchance, there
is no evidence to support it. The strict rules governing an action
are not applicable to a proceeding of this nature. Arbitrators
are permitted to disregard strict rules of the law of evidence,
and may decide according to their sense of equity. An. award
201. . the practice of arbitrators of conducting themselves as cham-
pions of their nominators is to be condemned as contrary to the purpoze of
arbitrations, and as calculated to bring the system of enforced arbitrations
into disrepute. An arbitrator acts in a quasi judicial capacity, and should
possess the judicial qualifications of fairness to both parties, so that he
may render a faithful, honest, and disinterested opinion. He is not an
advocate whose function is to convince the umpire or third arbitrator.
He should keep his own counsel, and not run to his nominator for advice
when he sees that he may be in the minority. When once he enters into
an arbitration he ceases to act as the agent of the party who appoints him.
He must lay aside all bias, and approach the case with a mind open to
conviction and without regard to his previously formed opinions as to the
merits of the party or the cause. He should sedulously refrain from any
conduct which might justify even the inference that either party is the
special recipient of his solicitude or favor. The oath of the arbitrators
is the rule and guide of their conduct." Aterfcan Eagle Fire Ins. Co. e.
New Jersey Ins. Co. (1925) 240 N. Y. 398, 405, 148 N. E. 562, 5G4. See
comment on this case in (1925) 35 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 106.
21 Matter of Priore (1923, 2d Dept.) 204 App. Div. 332, 198 N. Y.
Supp. 57.
22 Matter of Goff and Sons v. Rheinaner (1922, 1st Dept.) 199 App. Div.
617, 192 N. Y. Supp. 92.
2
3 Matter of Priore, supra note 21; Everett e. Browzn, szpra note 14;
Hano v. Blancliard Co. (1922, 1st Dept.) 199 N. Y. Supp. 227, wherein it
was said, "The arbitrators as a rule are not men trained in legal learning.
It is not to be expected that they will use language with that nicety and
precision of expression which is employed by lawyers and judges . . .
'certainty to a common or reasonable intent is all that the law requires'."
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by a majority of arbitrators is valid, unless the concurrence of
all is expressly required in the submission.
Under a provision of the New York Statute 4 relating to mis-
conduct of the arbitrators in refusing to postpone the hearing
for sufficient cause, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or to any other misbehavior by which
the rights of any party have been prejudiced, the personal in-
vestigation of the arbitrator without notice to the parties after
the close of the hearings, has been held prejudicial and sufficient
cause for vacating the award.2 r There is no provision in the
statute authorizing the courts to vacate an award because it is
against the weight of evidence or because perchance there is no
evidence to support it. The court has no supervisory powers
over an award. If the arbitrators keep within their jurisdiction,
their award will not be set aside because they may have erred in
judgment either upon the law or the facts.
26
Before hearing any testimony, arbitrators must be sworn, un-
der the statute of New York, faithfully and fairly to hear and ex-
amine the matters in controversy and to make a just award
according to the best of their understanding, unless the oath is
waived by the written consent of the parties to the submission
or their attorneys.2 7  This provision of the statute is not a juris-
dictional requirement, and may be waived by the conduct of the
parties.28  Accordingly, if a party with knowledge of' an irreg-
ularity in the proceedings, continues without objection to take
part in them, he waives any objection on account of such irreg-
ularity.29 There is no provision under the statute requiring
24 N. Y. C. P. A., 1921, sec. 1457 (3).
2 Berizzi Co. v. Krausz (1925) 239 N. Y. 315, 146 N. E. 436, reversing
(1924, lst Dept.) 208 App. Div. 322, 203 N. Y. Supp. 442, wherein it was hold
that the fact that the arbitrator acted in good faith in making his personal
investigation was not the less prejudicial. The court said on page 319 that
. . . sec. 1451 . . . provides that the arbitrators 'must appoint a
time and place for the hearing of the matters submitted to them, and must
cause notice thereof to be given to each of the parties.' There would be
little profit in fixing a time and place of hearing, if the arbitrators were at
liberty when the hearing was over to gather evidence ex parte, and rest
their award upon it". In this case, the buyer of merchandise shipped from
China to New York, refused to accept same on arrival, urging various ex-
cuses and, finally, defects of quality. Seller asked for arbitration pursuant
to a clause in the contract which was agreed to by the buyer, and after the
close of hearings, the arbitrator proceeded without notice to the parties to
make a personal investigation and learn, he said, that the merchandise was
defective; and it was on the strength of this investigation, as well as upon
the testimony submitted, that his award was made.26 Everett v. Brown, supra note 14; Anderson Trading Co. V. Brimberg
(1922, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 119 Misc. 784, 197 N. Y. Supp. 289.
27 N. Y. C. P. A., 1921, sec. 1452; Cohcn Iron Works Co. v. Jaffe (1921,
2d Dept.) 198 App. Div. 309, 190 N. Y. Supp. 476.28Krauter v. Pacific Trading Corp. (1921, 1st Dept.) 194 App. Div. 672,
186 N. Y. Supp. 109; Davis v. Rochester Can Co. (1924, Sup. Ct.) 124 Misc.
123, 207 N. Y. Supp. 33.
29 In Davis v. Rochester Can Co., supra note 28, it was held that in addi-
tion to the fact that no objection was interposed by either party to the
proceedings, every possible security assured to the defendant by the taking
of the arbitrator's oath was afforded it, by the constitutional oath which
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witnesses to be sworn.3 The refusal on the part of arbitrators
to permit a party to the submission to have his testimony taken
down by a stenographer and transcribed, is not deemed such
misbehavior as to entitle him to reject the award."
In an action to enforce an award, only such errors of serious
import as appear upon the face of the award can be examined.
The errors must be such that their commission is responsible for
the making of the award. A court of law may also inquire into
an award to ascertain if the arbitrator has exceeded his author-
ity or has decided some matter not included in the submission,
or has neglected to decide some question submitted to him. The
proceedings before the arbitrator, which form the basis of the
award, may also be a subject of inquiry for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the arbitration has been conducted in accordance
with the principles of "natural justice". These matters affect the
legality of the award itself, and if found to exist, a court of law
may regard the award as void. On the other hand, as to matters
which merely render the award a voidable determination, such
as, for example, the partiality, corruption, or misbehavior of the
arbitrator, or fraud extraneous to the award, a court of law
possesses no supervisory jurisdiction. A court of equity alone
has the power to set aside an award on such grounds.-2
The interpretation of the New York Law, as briefly sum-
marized in the preceding section, will undoubtedly be followed
in general in the other three states having somewhat similar
comprehensive laws, as well as in the Federal courts. In the
thirty-four other states" that have some kind of arbitration stat-
the individual members of the Interstate Commerce Commission (the arbi-
tors in this case), were required to take before entering upon the transac-
tion of the duties of their office. The same rule was applied in the case of
Krauter v. Pacific Trading Corp., s'upra note 28, where the controversy was
submitted to members of the New York Produce Exchange, who are re-
quired to take the oath of office pursuant to the by-laws of the organization.
'o N. Y. C. P. A., 1921, sec. 1453; Hano v. Blanchard Co., supra note 23.
-Anderson Trading Co. v. Brimberg, supra note 26, wherein defendant
moved to dismiss the award on the ground that the arbitrator refused to
have his testimony taken by a stenographer, the court saying, "there is no
rule, however, which requires this practice in arbitrations. . . . While
a refusal to permit a record to be made might in some cases be evidence of
misconduct, prejudice or failure to perform honestly the duties of an arbi-
trator, no attack is made in this case upon the fairness and honesty of the
arbitrator, and it appears affirmatively that the defendant's insistence for
a stenographic record was based upon his desire to review rulings upon
testimony and points of law. But such a review . . . is something he
would not be entitled to." The award of an arbitrator cannot be set aside
for mere errors of judgment whether as to the law or as to the facts.
See also Cohen Iron Works Co. v. Jaffe, supra note 27, wherein it wavs
sought to set aside an award on the grounds that the arbitrators failed to
take the oath as required by statute. The court held that the statutory re-
quirement was waived by the parties having signed an agreement to "waive
any provision as to form, and do hereby further agree that a memorandum
in writing signed by a majority of the board of arbitrators, shall be ac-
cepted as a decision duly made pursuant to the Arbitration Law."
3"Hano v. Blaicwhrd Co., szpra note 23.
33 These States include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colo-
rado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentuchy,
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ute, however, the majority of these decisions will probably not
be followed.
In several of the states, such as Maine and New Hampshire,
controversies may be referred to referees, appointed by the
courts, who file their report in court "for acceptance, rejection or
recommittal." In Connecticut, executive guardians, etc. may be
authorized by the probate courts to settle "any doubtful or dis-
puted claims." In Maryland, controversies between corporations
"in which the State may be interested as stockholder or creditor"
may be submitted to arbitration before the Board of Public
Works. In Vermont, the law provides for arbitration of a con-
troversy over an order of a building inspector, where the question
involved cannot be the subject of a civil suit. North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina or South Dakota ap-
parently make no statutory provision for arbitration in any form.
In the states other than New York, New Jersey, Oregon and
Massachusetts, statutory provisions for arbitration are more or
less limited in scope. Only existing disputes may be submitted
to arbitration-clauses in contracts to arbitrate future disputes
not being enforceable. Either party, under the majority of these
statutes, may withdraw from the arbitration at any time before
the award is rendered, if the submission has not been made a
"rule of court." In a few states, such as Illinois and Massachu-
setts, either party may request that any question of law arising
during the hearing be referred by the arbitrator to the court,
which may "in its discretion instruct the arbitrator upon a ques-
tion of substantive law," and such instruction is binding.
The submission to arbitration in most states must be in writing,
but in Arkansas, for instance, that may be inferred from the con-
duct of the parties. Arbitrators must be sworn in most states,
and have the same powers as a referee to subpoena witnesses, ad-
minister oaths, hear and determine the dispute, etc. In a few
states, such as Arizona and Delaware, arbitrators must possess
the qualifications of jurors.
"Any controversy which might be the subject of suit may be
submitted to arbitration", is a frequent statutory provision; but
questions of title to real estate are specifically excepted in such
states as California, Indiana, Michigan, etc. It is generally re-
quired that the award of the arbitrators shall be in writing and
be signed by the arbitrators; a majority decision is adequate in
most states. In some states, the award is given to the parties,
but generally it must be filed with the clerk of a court if it is to
be recorded as a judgment.
Awards may generally be set aside by the courts for fraud,
Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Ton-
nessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and
Wyoming.
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partiality, corruption, or other misconduct; but this varies occa-
sionally, as in Maine, where the court may accept, reject or re-
commit the award, either party may file exceptions and may
bring a writ of error to secure a reversal of a judgment thereon.
In Illinois, the aggrieved party may appeal on matters of law.
VI.
The American Bar Association, whose Committee on Com-
merce, Trade and Commercial Law drafted the United States
Arbitration Act and approved the proposed Uniform State Act,
based silbstantially upon the New Jersey Arbitration Law, had
until this year been definitely committed to the principle of pro-
viding for the arbitration of future disputes through the insertion
of an appropriate clause in a contract. The Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws expressed their disapproval of this policy,
however, and advocated a Uniform State Act which would limit
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement to existhzg contro-
versies. The conflict between these two policies was brought to
a head at the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association
of 1925, held last summer in Detroit, Michigan. The Commis-
sioners won out, so that the American Bar Association is now on
record as favoring legislation which limits arbitration to existing
disputes.
If trade security is to be made possible through arbitration, the
principles enunciated in the Federal Act and in those of New
York, New Jersey, Oregon and Massachusetts, must be enacted
into legislation. The absence of such enabling legislation is the
outstanding weakness of the statutes now in effect in the thirty-
four states previously mentioned. A provision in a contract to
arbitrate any dispute that may later arise thereunder is an in-
surance policy against litigation. Our factories and offices may
never be burned down, yet we always carry fire insurance policies.
Many business concerns never have lawsuits, yet they should be
permitted to insure themselves against the costs, delays and
friendship-destroying results of litigation. Only then will stu-
dents of our method of administering justice be able to note "the
striking absence of commercial cases from the trial lists" of the
courts of the United States.
